THE ROLE OF BOARD STRUCTURES IN INCREASING BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: GLOBAL EXPERIENCE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36690/2674-5208-2024-2-73-88Keywords:
corporate governance, banking institutions, board structures, board governance, global banking system, accountabilityAbstract
The governance of banking institutions plays a critical role in the stability and integrity of financial systems globally. The structure of the board of directors significantly influences how banks manage risks, comply with regulations, and align operations with the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Understanding how board structures differ across regulatory and cultural landscapes is crucial for enhancing bank accountability and performance. This article aims to critically evaluate how various board structures impact the accountability of banking institutions across different global contexts. The goal is to identify effective governance practices that can be adapted to improve bank accountability worldwide. Employing a comparative case study methodology, this research analyzes board structures in banking institutions across continents including North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Data from primary sources like interviews and secondary sources such as regulatory documents and academic articles are synthesized to assess the impact of board configurations on governance and accountability. The analysis reveals that effective board structures often include a high proportion of independent directors, robust audit and risk committees, and a commitment to diversity, which correlate with enhanced accountability and financial performance. However, variations exist due to cultural, economic, and regulatory differences that influence board effectiveness across regions. The findings suggest that while there is a global trend towards standardizing governance practices, local adaptations remain essential. The study recommends that banks and regulators focus on enhancing board independence, diversifying board composition, and strengthening risk oversight to improve governance frameworks. Future governance models should incorporate a dynamic approach to adapt to technological advancements, economic shifts, and societal expectations, ensuring that banking institutions can effectively meet emerging challenges and opportunities.
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