

# ORGANIZATIONAL AND ECONOMIC MECHANISM OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF UKRAINE ECONOMY RECOVERY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL, MANAGERIAL AND CORRUPTION RISKS

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**Abstract.** *The article examines the content and components of the organizational and economic mechanisms of public management of the post-war and post-catastrophe recovery of the country's economy. Attention is paid to the impact of institutional, managerial and corruption risks on the reconstruction process. The stages (generations) of the reconstruction of the economies of the countries of the world after wars and disasters have been determined. An analysis of successful and unsuccessful global practices of international assistance for social and economic recovery is presented. The universal components of the national model of the organizational and economic mechanism of the public management of reconstruction are highlighted, for example, joint with the international community, careful planning to overcome the consequences of wars and disasters, the formation of the management organizational structure of the revival process, its financial support from various sources. It is emphasized that after the war, the fight against corruption will become the main challenge in Ukraine. The key elements of the organizational and economic mechanism of the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine based on the minimization of risks of an institutional, managerial and corruption nature are proposed. It is noted that, taking into account international experience, Ukraine has already begun the process of planning post-war economic rehabilitation with the initiative of the country's government to widely involve the world community in its discussion and implementation. As part of the work, it was stated that the plan should be clear in terms of goals, limited in time, consistent in execution, defined by final results. The article draws attention to the fact that Ukraine should become the "owner of the reconstruction", carry out the transformation itself under close international supervision and control. The need for coordination and integration of international aid, internal budgetary and extra-budgetary resources, investments, loans, and technical support based on the "single window" principle is indicated. In this regard, it is emphasized the need to form a reliable and authoritative institution that will be responsible for the process of reconstruction of Ukraine, coordination of internal and external efforts.*

**Keywords:** *Ukraine, organizational and economic mechanism of public management, post-war economy, recovery, institutional risk, managerial risk, corruption risk, international aid, donor countries, recipient country.*

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**Introduction.** Functioning under the conditions of martial law and post-war socio-economic reconstruction became a new powerful challenge for Ukrainian public administration. The question arose of scientific search and discussion of effective directions of transformation of the organizational and economic mechanism of state and municipal management that meets the requirements of the time. The appearance of war dangers did not reduce, but even increased the need to take into account the influence of managerial, institutional, and corruption risks on the public administration system, which determined the relevance of this study.

**Literature review.** The theoretical aspects of the formation of the mechanism of public administration and its components are reflected in the scientific works of Yu. Kovbasyuk, M. Minenko, M. Sitsinska, O. Fedorchak, O. Shatylo, and others. The issue of the influence of managerial, institutional, and corruption challenges on the functioning of the organizational and economic mechanism of public administration was reflected in the scientific work of such domestic and foreign researchers as, in particular, A. Vasina, T. Zhelyuk, A. Melnyk, P. Mykytyuk, D. North, M. Shkilniak and others.

The mechanism of public management is a system of implementation special means of regulatory influence ensuring on social and economic systems at various levels in order to ensure decent living conditions for people [1]. Such a mechanism has a number of functional features, according to which its varieties and their combinations are classified – organizational, economic, informational, technical, administrative, etc [2, p. 42]. The organizational mechanism is an internal organization that determines the algorithm and procedure for carrying out activities (economic, managerial, etc.), making managerial decisions aimed at solving the set tasks under the condition of maximizing the quality of the final result and minimizing the total resources involved. The economic mechanism is based on the application of a set of economic methods, forms, tools, principles of influence on processes and relations. The organizational and economic mechanism of public management of the war and post-war economy is the consistent implementation of actions based on fundamental principles, target orientation using a specific set of methods and regulatory tools, which should provide the country with the opportunity to become independent from foreign aid within a clearly defined period – to start earning, produce and export own products.

In the process of implementing the organizational and economic management mechanism for the recovery of the country's economy, the public authorities in the form of state bodies and local self-government bodies face a number of risks, the key ones of which include institutional, managerial, and corruption risks. Institutional risk is defined as the probability of an undesirable event occurrence caused by the imperfection of the institutional environment, the irrationality of institutions, and the opportunistic behavior of economic subjects [3, p. 116-117]. Management risks arise as a result of making irrational management decisions by managers of various levels, especially higher ones [4]. Corruption risk is the probability of committing a violation related to corruption, which will negatively affect the achievement of the established goals and objectives by the public authority [5].

**Aims.** The purpose of the study is to study the formation of organizational and economic mechanisms of public management of the recovery of the country's economy after wars and disasters under the influence of institutional, management and corruption risks. During the analysis, the following tasks were formulated:

- to analyze the successes and failures of international aid for the reconstruction of countries after wars and destruction;
- summarize the typical components of the organizational and economic mechanism of the state and municipal management of the recovery period;
- to propose key elements of the organizational and economic mechanism of public management of the post-war recovery of Ukraine on the basis of minimizing risks of an institutional, managerial and corruption nature.

**Methodology.** The main research methods are: monographic, retrospective, institutional, observation, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalization, comparative analysis. The information base of scientific development is scientific publications of domestic and foreign scientists, information and statistical materials of international organizations, public authorities of Ukraine, personal scientific research.

**Results.** The following stages (generations) of post-war, post-catastrophe reconstructions are distinguished: I – recovery of Western European economies after the Second World War; II – modernization of the economies of Eastern Europe (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo) after the "cold war" and the destruction of the socialist camp to support democratic transformations; the third stage is connected with the consequences of the terrorist act in the USA on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent wars in the Middle East – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, with the aim of guaranteeing security. We believe that the Russian-Ukrainian war and the future socio-economic reconstruction initiated a new stage of post-war revival, because, as in the first generation, we are talking about an imperialist war waged by a large country to establish dominance over a smaller state and deprive it of its independence.

The history of large-scale rebuilding of economies after wars and destruction teaches us lessons, points to the reasons for successes and failures. Historical experience needs to be assimilated and adapted to the national model of public management of recovery and allows us to single out certain universal components of the organizational and economic mechanism of state and municipal management:

1. After the damage inventory, the formation of a comprehensive, clear, consistent, strictly time-bound, sufficiently resourced, clear, and transparent reconstruction plan. It is about joint planning with the international community for socio-economic recovery. The war is ongoing, and careful planning to deal with its consequences must be actively underway now. Eloquent examples are the most successful in world practice the plan for the reconstruction of Europe by J. K. Marshall 1947-1952, the plan for the reconstruction and recovery of Indonesia 2005-2012 due to the tsunami in 2004, the plan for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq 2003-2014, the plan with reconstruction of Haiti in 2010-2011 as a result of the 2010 earthquake, etc.

After the 2004 earthquakes in Indonesia, when the province of Aceh and o. Nias, the country's reconstruction plan proved to be effective because it included, in particular, a phased approach to financing: first the physical reconstruction of buildings

and communities, then the reconstruction of the infrastructure, and then long-term economic development projects. The recovery experience provided Indonesia with a "safety cushion" and a scenario for actions in the event of similar disasters in the future, and was used in other provinces.

On the contrary, the lack of planning for the rehabilitation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the destruction caused by the Bosnian War of 1992-1996 (the last plan for post-war Sarajevo was dated 1983, calculated for 30 years, and did not change after the war), despite unprecedented international support and billions of dollars investments, led to the fact that funds were spent without any vision, local authorities used resources only to repair damaged objects [6]. The presence of management risk is undeniable. There was a plan for the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan in 2001-2006 for significant amounts – about 150 billion dollars, but it was also recognized as a failure, as it did not have an awareness of a certain global plan, and was a series of short-term projects. The country was not ready to accept large-scale international aid, because it is important not to separate politics, economy and social transformations. The lesson from this case is also that there is no need to delay the development and implementation of the recovery plan before the end of the war, because the support must be timely [7].

After the war, the international community provided financial assistance to Iraq for political and socio-economic recovery according to the relevant plan, the feature of which was to eliminate the weaknesses of the country's security environment – the deformed structure of the economy; extremely low standard of living; limited access of the population to safe water sources and stable water supply; the problem of violence against local residents, the Iraqi armed forces, workers of international aid missions, etc. The collective international support for 2003-2014 reached more than 220 billion dollars, had the appropriate implementation logic: first, according to the plan, it was directed to the quick solution of primary humanitarian problems – the provision of water, food, medicine, then – to infrastructure projects for restoration and the creation of electricity and ultimately accounted for 30% of the country's total generation; the construction and reconstruction of water supply and drainage, which allowed the restoration of services for 2.7 million Iraqis; restoration of the irrigation structure of agriculture, creation of 54 private agricultural associations, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations; promoting the development of the private sector by focusing on financial sector issues, providing microcredits (provided 22,000 microloans to small and micro-business entities, as a result of which 32,000 jobs were created in the private sector), reforming state-owned enterprises, carrying out institutional and regulatory reforms, etc. Subsequently, the priority directions became the restoration of oil production, the reconstruction of the health and education sectors, the creation of waste management systems, etc. [8]. However, despite careful planning, one of the reasons for the failure of the Iraq reconstruction program was high institutional risk – local experts were not involved in the development of the plan.

The plan for economic recovery after wars and disasters must be clear to both foreign donors and investors, as well as to local businesses and the population, and encourage active participation in transformations, creating an internal financial basis

through the formation of state and local budgets. The government's modernization program is designed to unite national interests, to be consistent with the international aid plan for the provision of donor funds, technical support, investment and credit resources, the use of confiscated assets, and reparations. Emphasis is needed not just on physical reconstruction, but the integration of economic, social, political, and ecological aspects of the restoration of public life. Finally, it is necessary to finally get rid of the Soviet legacy and the form of social organization that prevailed in the USSR. The implementation of recovery measures at all stages should be permeated with preventive anti-corruption measures. They need to be installed in the transformation system so that they work automatically. This is an unconditional and unconditional guarantee of the formation of trust in its implementation. In our opinion, the fight against corruption will be the main challenge in post-war Ukraine. So far, our state has not achieved tangible success on this front. Just as the Ukrainian people convinced the world community at the beginning of the war of their unwavering desire to defend their statehood and independence and thus earned respect for themselves and large-scale military aid, so overcoming corruption risks should become a new discovery for our country. It is time to activate the formation of anti-corruption culture in Ukrainian society. This is a change in the social material in the environment of the country, a reboot of many people's lives.

2. Formation of a management organizational structure of aid, a conditional "superstate", "local owner" to coordinate and control the use of resources. In accordance with the American Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction in Europe (The US Economic Recovery Act of 1948), two organizations were specially created to maintain the constant relationship between donor and recipient countries: on the part of the United States – the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and on the part of European countries – Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). About 5% of the amount of aid was directed to the maintenance of institutional support. ECA's regional office in Paris and offices in each recipient country monitored cash flows and assessed the effectiveness of reconstruction processes. In accordance with the bilateral agreements concluded by the US and each recipient country, the recipient's requirements and obligations were defined in terms of achieving the program's goals, providing economic information for needs assessment, and meeting key performance indicators (KPI). The UEEC developed recommendations and coordinated the distribution of aid between states according to a pre-agreed algorithm based on the analysis of economic indicators and the needs of countries, developed a plan, determined the directions of investment projects, and promoted the joint implementation of reforms [9, p. 260]. All projects were approved by the American organization ECA. In post-war Europe, the Marshall Plan was the most successful in Germany, Great Britain, and France – in those countries where the Americans used a significant range of instruments of influence and the ability to almost completely monitor the use of the resources provided by them. Actually, this approach demonstrated its positive results when providing weapons to Ukraine in 2022.

After the 2004 earthquakes, the Government of Indonesia created the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR Agency), the main mission of which was to

coordinate donor aid with the specific local needs of communities, monitor the compliance of support projects with the government's reconstruction plan, ensure transparency of the financing process, and implement about 20,000 projects. In which more than 650 funding funds and 560 performing partners were involved [10]. BRR Agency received a full mandate from the local government to coordinate reconstruction, becoming a transparent and accountable structure. For Indonesia's recovery, part of the international funding was provided through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), which operated under the management of the World Bank until 2012 and pooled funding from about 15 donors and several non-governmental organizations. UNDP and the Asian Development Bank became partners of the Fund. The MDTF ensured integration with the Indonesian government budget, preparation of operational disbursement reports and integrity in the use of donor funds. Administrative, institutional, and corruption risks were minimized.

To eliminate the consequences of the 2010 earthquake, the Haitian government, together with the international community, created the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) for 18 months – an institution to manage the reconstruction process, co-chaired by the country's Prime Minister and the UN Special Envoy. The IHRC set the program and funding goals for the collective donors, coordinating their resources to support the implementation of the plan to achieve both long-term and immediate goals. The work of the Temporary Commission was supervised by its board, which included representatives of the legislative, executive, judicial authorities, the private sector, trade unions of the recipient country, and representatives of donors. For in-depth monitoring of approved projects, the IHRC established the Office of Performance and Accountability. In addition to the mentioned Commission, there were also separate initiatives for the reconstruction of the economy, which were taken care of by the government, non-governmental organizations, municipal authorities and local businesses in the territory of communities. Despite the significant successes of the restoration – during the four years of the program, 90% of the displaced people received permanent housing, about 300 km of roads were rebuilt – the case of Haiti is considered a failure due to large amounts of corruption.

Foreign aid to Syria during the civil war, which began in 2011 and continues to this day, is provided through The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (EUTF), established in 2014, which was attended by 52, including non-European countries, EU organizations, international and non-governmental institutions. The purpose of the formation of the EUTF was to centralize funds and combine efforts into a single strategy for the reconstruction of Syria and humanitarian aid. The fund is managed by the European Commission, to ensure its functions, 1% of the accumulated funds is directed. The Supervisory Board (Trust Board) as an element of the management structure determines and adjusts the general strategy of the fund, evaluates the results of the operation of the Operational Board and managers, makes decisions on attracting new donors. The operational board is responsible for making decisions on the distribution of funds, evaluating the effectiveness of finances and ensuring transparency and accountability of their use. Control over the operation of the fund and its management structures by reviewing audit conclusions and annual reports

is carried out by the European Parliament and the EU Anti-Corruption Agency – the European Office for the Prevention of Abuse and Fraud (Office européen de lutte anti-fraude, OLAF).

The resources of 43 donor institutions were provided to Iraq through bilateral support, international financial organizations, trust funds, among which was the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), which branched into the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (WBITF) and the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDGITF). The operations of the World Bank were financed from a number of sources: IRFFI, ordinary loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, soft loans of the International Development Association, and actually funds of the World Bank for technical support. Administration of US aid – the largest donor to the reconstruction of Iraq – was carried out by the State Department through the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), the US Department of Defense through the Project Coordination Office, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the Agency for International Development (USAID) and others. Funding from the US government came through the IRFFI, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraqi Freedom Fund. The second most important donor for the reconstruction of Iraq was Japan, whose projects were managed and financed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). EU financial aid came through IRFFI, the UN and humanitarian organizations [8]. As we can see, the institutional structure of Iraq's donors is quite extensive, but due to the fact that the role of national institutions was negated and the country was actually under external management after the military intervention under the auspices of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by the USA, the results of reconstruction Iraq is rated as quite modest.

Post-war Afghanistan generally lacked a management structure for coordinating foreign aid, so the restoration of the economy was no longer the responsibility of local authorities, but of donors. Therefore, along with financial support, efforts are needed to build strong rational institutions.

3. Financial resources from various sources – significant funds mostly in the form of grants, loans on preferential terms and support of the economy in the process of reconstruction [9, p. 259]. According to the Marshall Plan, this is primarily US funding, but some aid recipient countries were obliged to make contributions through appropriate special funds. Funds from US financial support were transferred to the funds of the recipient countries, from which the goods of American suppliers were paid in dollars, and European consumers had to pay in the local currency to strengthen it. According to the Marshall Plan, 16 European countries received financial support, and their GDP increased by an average of 33%. Currently, the situation is characterized by the fact that the European Union, Japan and other leading countries of the world are among the key players on the world stage.

In Indonesia, to overcome the consequences of the natural disaster, 7 billion dollars of both international aid and the resources of the country's government were mobilized, the use of which was carried out on the principles of transparency and strict accountability. Funding for Syria in response to the challenges of the civil war is in the

form of grants and loans in a 50/50 ratio. Funds on a project basis are directed mostly to security, medical services, education, financial assistance to the population, and social initiatives. Project reporting on the collection and distribution of resources, periodic assessment of the implementation of the strategy and effects for the recipient are mandatory. On the contrary, the huge amount of donor funding and the significant amount of projects did not allow to diversify the Iraqi economy, to give impetus to the development of the private sector, to move away from oil dependence, in particular, due to the separation from the Iraqi state apparatus of foreign funding, which was directed mostly through off-budget channels. This was explained by donors' doubts about the political and administrative capacity of the Iraqi government to effectively use the aid provided. Large-scale financing of Haiti allowed the country's GDP to grow by a modest 4% due to extensive corruption and, as a result, lost opportunities.

**Discussion.** The process of planning the post-war reconstruction of the economy, taking into account international experience, has begun and continues in Ukraine. The Lugano Declaration contains the guiding principles and conditions of international assistance to our country based on partnership, focus on reforms, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, democratic participation, involvement of many stakeholders, gender equality and inclusion, and sustainable development [11]. The Ukraine Recovery Plan, proposed by the country's government for 2022-2032, provides for the implementation of 850 projects within 10 years, funding of approximately 750 billion dollars, annual real GDP growth of more than 7%, inclusion in the 25 leading countries according to the index economic complexity and human capital index [12].

The analysis of the successes and failures of the global practices of economic recovery after wars and disasters allows us to formulate the following key elements of the organizational and economic mechanism of the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine on the basis of minimizing managerial, institutional and corruption risks: first, the reconstruction plan must be clear, limited in time, consistent with defining short- (reconstruction of critically needed facilities, solving urgent economic and social issues), medium- (modernization of infrastructure branches, increasing their overall efficiency), long-term (structural restructuring of the economy based on innovation) goals. When formulating a plan, the results to be achieved must be clear, that is, the effect must be measurable. Ukraine should become the "owner of the reconstruction", which itself carries out the transformation under the close supervision of the international community.

Secondly, coordination and integration of internal budgetary and extra-budgetary resources, international aid, investments, loans, technical support according to the "single window" principle. Any expenditure must strictly comply with the pre-agreed recovery plan, in order not only to return Ukraine's economy to the pre-war level, but also to ensure its sustainable economic development. To coordinate reconstruction, local administrative and public institutions should be created so that citizens can directly participate in the restoration of their own country – this will allow Ukrainians to develop a sense of confidence and self-importance, provided, of course, that warnings about internal corruption are overcome.



Thirdly, the formation of a reliable institution that will be responsible for the process of reconstruction of Ukraine, the coordination of internal and external efforts – due to the numerous sources of assistance, a specially created independent international structure should take care of the reconstruction. It can be, following the example of Indonesia, an agency that is essentially similar to a separate ministry, or a reconstruction fund or bank, as was the case with the Marshall Plan. Such a structure should be affiliated with the EU and have clearly established terms of existence, because projects with an indefinite implementation period are not very effective. This institution should receive from the local authorities the autonomy to make management decisions, for example, to provide funding to the government without agreement with other international structures and politicians, or, on the contrary, to stop or withdraw assistance in case of inappropriate use of funds.

**Conclusions.** The organizational and economic mechanism of public administration as a system of forms, methods, means, and instruments of influence on the social and economic state of the country should contribute to the consistent practical realization of the goals of the state and society in the process of post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. The reconstruction process must become transparent and accountable at all stages in order to preserve the trust and respect that arose in our country and its state apparatus as a result of resisting the aggressor. Foreign control is the price of international aid, and institutional capacity, effective organizational measures, management solutions, anti-corruption levers of its use are the key to reducing the risks of national and international donors, investors and creditors to ensure opportunities for sustainable socio-economic development of Ukraine.

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